

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-10

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: EI PFOR EEC

SUBJECT: IRISH AMBASSADOR CALLS ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HARTMAN

1. IRISH AMBASSADOR MOLLOY CALLED MARCH 21, AT HIS REQUEST, ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN TO REVIEW GENERAL STATE OF US-EUROPE RELATIONS. AFTER A BRIEF EXPLANATION BY HARTMAN OF THE ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW, MOLLOY EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR THE APPOINTMENT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL STATE OF US-EC RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF "EXTRAORDINARY" STATEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE OF LATE. WORDS LIKE HOSTILITY AND LEGITIMACY WERE STRONG FARE INDEED, PARTICULARLY WHEN USED BY THE SECRET

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PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HARTMAN SAID, BY

WAY OF BACKGROUND, THAT WE REGARDED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH GREAT CONCERN. THE EC DECISION ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY ON MARCH 4 CONCERNING EC-ARAB COOPERATION HAD BROUGHT MATTERS TO A HEAD. PRIOR TO THAT WE HAD OF COURSE DISCUSSED THE TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP WE DESIRED WITH EUROPE, BUT MORE IN TERMS OF SEMANTICS THAN REAL ISSUES. THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN COPENHAGEN LAST FALL AND IN BRUSSELS LAST DECEMBER WHEN THE SECRETARY HAD MET FOREIGN MINISTER FITZGERALD. WE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED EC-ARAB RELATIONSHIPS, HARTMAN SAID, WITH THE EC COUNTRIES. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT GIVEN THE FACT WE ARE PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT, WE SHOULD

HAVE HAD CLOSER CONTACT AND CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EC COUNTRIES BEFORE THEY ANNOUNCED THEIR DECISION PUBLICLY ON MARCH 4. IT WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND BECAUSE MOST OF THE EC COUNTRIES HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD US THAT THEY AGREED WITH OUR APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS LACK OF CONSULTATION HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS BEFORE. THE NOVEMBER 6 EC DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ANNOUNCED ON THE SAME DAY THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ARRIVED IN CAIRO. THE TIMING OF THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HAD CLEARLY MADE OUR TASK MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT HAD GONE BEYOND POSITIONS TAKEN BY SOME OF THE MODERATE ARABS. IT HAD, IN FACT, PUT SADAT IN A MORE DIFFICULT POSITION. THUS, THE TIMING AND TERMS OF THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WERE NOT HELPFUL. IF WE HAD BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE EC MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE.

2. REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE FRG RECENTLY PROPOSED A FORM OF US-EC CONSULTATIONS WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE COMMUNICATING TO US THE SUBSTANCE OF DECISIONS IT HAD TAKEN WHICH MIGHT AFFECT US INTERESTS BEFORE THESE DECISIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR FINAL APPROVAL. HARTMAN SAID THE FRG PROPOSAL WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION, IN WHICH SOME EC STATES PASSED US PAPERS IN CONFIDENCE ON THE CONDITION THAT WE NOT REFER TO THEM IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS, IS OBVIOUSLY

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UNSATISFACTORY.

3. BEFORE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL WENT TO THE ENERGY CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON WE WERE TOLD THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS FULLY WITH US THE QUESTION OF EC-ARAB COOPERATION. SCHEEL EXPLAINED TO US APOLOGETICALLY THAT HE HAD HOPED TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH US ON THAT SUBJECT; HOWEVER, SINCE THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD NOT

REACHED A DECISION, HE WAS UNABLE TO CONSULT. HE COULD ONLY TELL US IN GENERAL TERMS WHAT THE EC NINE HAD IN MIND. WE THEREFORE EXPRESSED, ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, US CONCERN OVER THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WHICH WOULD BRING ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES TOGETHER WITH THE EC AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THE RESULT WOULD ONLY BE TO RADICALIZE THE ARAB WORLD. SADAT AND FAISAL HAD WARNED US OF THAT, AND WE HAD SEEN IT HAPPEN AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN LAHORE.

WE WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SUCH A MEETING ON THE FOLLOW-ON WORK TO THE ENERGY CONFERENCE. MOREOVER,

IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT EC-ARAB TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT QUICKLY GO INTO POLITICAL ISSUES. OUR EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE ARAB WORLD WAS THAT THEY USUALLY START BY SAYING THEY DO NOT KNOW IF A RELATIONSHIP IS POSSIBLE UNLESS THEY KNOW IN ADVANCE WHETHER OR NOT YOU SUPPORT THE ARABS. HARTMAN STRESSED THAT WE HAD HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THESE VIEWS TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY.

4. HARTMAN SAID THAT WHEN WE SAW SCHEEL THE EVENING OF MARCH 3, BEFORE THE MARCH 4 EC COUNCIL MEETING, HE HAD JUST COME FROM A MEETING WITH JOBERT. WE BELIEVED THAT ON THE BASIS OF OUR TALK WITH SCHEEL THAT THE EC UNDERSTOOD US CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO PLAY DOWN THE IDEA OF A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARABS ON OIL AND POLITICAL ISSUES. WE BELIEVED THEREFORE THAT SCHEEL HAD EXPLAINED THIS TO HIS COLLEAGUES. WE WERE ASTONISHED TO HEAR LATER THAT SOME OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD EVIDENTALLY BELIEVED THEIR DECLARATION OF MARCH 4 HAD MET
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OUR CONCERNS.

5. AMBASSADOR MOLLOY SAID THAT OUR REACTION HAD EVEN TAKEN THE GERMANS BY SURPRISE. HARTMAN SAID HE COULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THAT, BASED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SCHEEL OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING. THIS SHOWS, SAID HARTMAN, DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE NATURE OF CONSULTATIONS, AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE THIS POINT IN HIS LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BRANDT. WE WILL NOW FOCUS ON THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT HAVE COME SO CLEARLY TO THE FORE AND PUT ASIDE OUR SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. WE HAVE THEREFORE DISCONTINUED OUR TALKS ON AN EC DECLARATION AND WE HAVE DROPPED THE IDEA OF A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO EUROPE UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE EUROPEANS, DESPITE

WHAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID RECENTLY. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES FURTHER IN BILATERAL CHANNELS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL BE EVALUATING THE PACE AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONTACT WITH THE NINE WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO RUSH COMPLETION OF THE DECLARATION EXERCISE. HARTMAN POINTEDLY CITED TWO OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA AND WHEN THE SECRETARY VISITS BONN AND LONDON NEXT WEEK.

6. HARTMAN ASKED IF FOREIGN MINISTER FITZGERALD WOULD ATTEND THE SPECIAL SESSION. MOLLOY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD NOTIFY US SOON.

7. AFTER A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF US CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS, AND IRELAND'S EXCLUSION FROM NATO CONSULTATIONS, HARTMAN STATED OUR DESIRE FOR CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE IRISH IN BILATERAL CHANNELS BOTH IN DUBLIN AND WASHINGTON, WITH MAJOR FOCUS IN DUBLIN.

8. DCM SMALL SAID SOME EUROPEANS WOULD ARGUE THAT THE MARCH 4 DECLARATION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH US EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HARTMAN SAID THIS WOULD BE A SERIOUS DIFFERENCE IN ASSESSMENTS. MOLLOY ASKED WHAT THE PRESIDENT MEANT BY THE TERM "EC HOSTILITY". HARTMAN EXPLAINED THAT THE
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PRESIDENT WAS SPEAKING TO A US AUDIENCE AND USED A FORM OF VERBAL SHORTHAND TO MAKE THE POINT THAT WE HAD ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WITH THE EC.

9. TOWARD CLOSE, MOLLOY SAID THAT SINCE IRELAND WOULD HAVE THE EC CHAIR DURING FIRST HALF OF 1975, IT WAS IN INTERESTS OF BOTH OF US THAT WE WORK CLOSELY. HARTMAN AGREED. KISSINGER

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